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T

oday there are remarkably few international wars. This does not mean the
end of war, which still continues, but it does mean that the type of war emblematic of the contemporary era is not classic international war, but rather a kind
of civil war familiar to students of colonial history: a conflict that may begin largely
within a society, but becomes internationalized, involving foreign forces on o nc or
both sides. Very often such wars begin, and continue, because the structure of the
State is weak: this fact enables insurgents to operate, and it also resu1ts in outside
governments getting involved in var ious ways, not least in the attempt to bolster
the State's credibility and performance. Where there is more than one weakState in
a region and a porous border area between, the opportunities for insurgents are
magnified. In all these respects the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan is typical of
wars of the twenty-first century. Yet it is also unique, not only because it has distinctive attributes, but also because, as will be indicated below, it has had extraordinary effects on international relations.
The central question that is explored here is: what are the implications of wars in
Afghanistan for international security, not only in the region, but also m ore generally? In exploring this question there is much to draw upon, not;ust from Western
involvement in Afghanistan since 2001, but also from the past two centuries of
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Afghan history. However, we cannot foresee exactly how the present war will conclude. Events that may determine how it ends are by nature unknowable: for example, the accuracy or otherwise of an assassin's bullet, another major scandal in the
treatment of prisoners, bombings from the air resulting in massive civilian deaths,
an al-Qaeda attack that alienates more than it mobilizes or the emergence elsewhere of a new conflict which distracts attention from Afghanistan.
Despite these uncertainties, the central question can be approached by looking
first into four related questions about wars in Afghanistan and their influence on
international security.
• What have been the effects of previous wars in Afghanistan, particularly in
the nineteenth centu.ry and in the Soviet period 1979-89, on regional and
international security?
• How should the almost continuous wars in Afghanistan since 1989 be
characterized, and what have been the effects of their Pakistani dimension?
• What have been the roles of the United Nations in the long-running Afghan
crisis, including its post-2001 post-conflict peace-building role and in assisting
the return of refugees?
• In the war since 200 1, what problems have there been in fitting Western
military doctrines, practices and institutions to Afghan realities? What has been
the role of airpower? How has NATO performed in this unanticipated
commitment? Are counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrines fit for the purpose for
which they are being used in Afghanistan? And how can progress be judged?
The exploration of the fourth question, which forms the main part of this survey, leads to the concluding discussion of the actual and possible future effects of
the war on international security, including on two major institutions, the United
Nations and NATO. Some policy choices are briefly summarized.

L ussonsfromAfghan Wars up to 1989
Much is often made of how warfare in general has, or has not, been transformed.
Perhaps because several of us have had training in history, in Oxford University's
research program "The Changing Character of War" we attempt to draw a sharp
distinction between what is new and what merely appears to be new. That attempt
is certainly necessary when considering the war in Afghanistan. It is often said that
modern wars constitute a "new paradigm." This proposition depends, to a greater
or lesser degree, on the implicit assumption that past international wars were a
straightforward matter of so-called "conventional" forces fighting each other.
They were not. In considering what is unique about the ongoing war in
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Afghanistan, it may be useful to bear in mind two parts of the country's historical
legacy: nineteenth-century wars and the experience of the Soviet war.
The Nineteenth Century and After
Many modern wars, including that in Afghanistan, fit quite well the general description of colonial conflicts offered by Major C.E. Callwell of the Royal Artillery
in 1899 in his justly famous manual Small Wars. Callwell him selfhad served during
the dosing stages of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, when he marched through the
Khyber Pass to join the Kabul field force .l It was on the basis of experience that he
wrote two decades later:
Small wars are a heritage of extended empire, a certain epilogue to encroachments into
lands beyond the confmes of existing civilization, and this has been so from early ages
to the present time. Conquerors of old penetrating into the unknown encountered
races with strange and unconventional military methods and trod them down, seizing
their territory; revolts and insurrections foUowed, disputes and quarrels with tribes on
the borders of the districts overcome supervened, out of the original campaign of
conquest sprang further wars, and all were vexatious, desultory, and harassing. And the
history of those small wars repeats itself in the small wars of to-day.2
In the nineteenth century the British Army was involved in two major campaigns in Afghanistan, in 1839--42 and 1878-80. The first, fought ostensibly to assist a weak ruler and to provide a friendly buffer State on India's northwest border,
was a hubristic enterprise that was marked by disaster-the wiping out of a reduced garrison as it struggled back to the Khyber Pass) The second war, which was
fought to counterbalance Russian influence in Afghanistan, provided evidence
that apparent success in Afghanistan can be quickly followed by uprisings and setbacks. The British, having defeated the Afghan State, had no political solution except to appoint a suitable " warlord" as head of State. What did Callwell have to say
specifically about the type of war that had been encountered in Afghanistan and
elsewhere in the late nineteenth century? His words are as pertinent today as when
they were penned over a century ago:
With the capture of the capital any approach to organized resistance, under the direct
control of the head of the State, will almost always cease; but it does not by any means
follow that the conflict is at an end .. . . [Tlhe French experiences in Algeria. and the
British experiences in Afghanistan, show that these irregular, protracted, indefmite
operations offer often far greater difficulties to the regular armies than the attainment
of their original military objective.4
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The wars in Afghanistan in the nineteenth cent ul)' have been the foundation for
a view of the countl)' and its peoples---especially the latter-as unusually resistant
to any kind of foreign influence or control, actual or perceived. David Loyn, the
veteran BBC reporter on Afghanistan who has charted these previous conflicts, argues that mistakes are being repeated today because of a neglect of the study of history. H e charges that the United States and Britain have fa iled to understand the
extent of resistance in Afghanistan to anything that looks like foreign control. It
follows, states Loyn, that it is necessary for o utsiders to accept a vel)' limited role,
and to negotiate with the Taliban. S This is o ne important perspective on wars in Afghanistan. However, it should not be taken to imply that there is uniform hostility
to all foreign influence. Both between and within Afghanistan's distinct ethnic
groups there is a long tradition of bitter contestation, and in all Afghanistan's wars
som e groups have had arrangements of one kind or another with outside patrons
and powers.
Much of the country's histol)' exposes the fragility of the idea of the Afghan
State. Twentieth-centul)' Afghanistan was characterized not only by wars against
foreigners, such as the Third Anglo-Afghan War, of May 1919, but also by civil
wars, assassinations and coups, as in the conflict of 1928-3 1 and the seizures of
power by Daud Khan in 1953 and 1973. Throughout the twentieth centul)', there
was a continuous interplay between the development of constitutional government and the continuation of political violence. The role of the Pashtun peoples in
Afghanistan was one of many bones of contention. The political culture of Afghanistan was characterized by State weakness and general instability.
The Soviet War in Afghanistan, 1979-89
The war in 1979-89 between the Soviet -backed government of Afghanistan and its
mujahidin adversaries had major effects on international politics. In particular, the
war had a vast impact in the Soviet Unio n. It accentuated the Soviet Union's sense
of imperial overstretch, contributed to a decline of fai th in the use of force to maintain the empire and accentuated doubts about a central purpose of Soviet foreign
policy-the maintenance of a network of dependent, demanding a nd hard1y popular socialist regimes in an assortment of countries aro und the world. It fo rmed part
of the background to the role of civil resistance movements in central and Eastern
Europe pursuing their struggles by non -violent m eans to a successful o utcom e in
1989. In short, the Afghan war contributed to the collapse of the Soviet empire.
This vel)' fact is not only proof of the fateful consequences that may flow fro m war
in Afghanistan, but is also one driver of the present war. Osam a Bin Laden has
made no secret of his belief that, having helped to destroy the Soviet Unio n, he
aims to do the sam e for the United States. One down, one to go! This was not the
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only case of post-Cold War hubris-there were also many variants of this condition elsewhere, including in the British and American governments-but it was a
notably severe one. Bin Laden's interpretation of events led him to 9/1 1 and engulfed Afghanistan in continuing war.
There were other ways in which the Soviet-Afghan war led to subsequent wars.
The channeling of much international aid to mujahiditl groups through Pakistan
reinforced the fa teful link between events in Pakistan and those in Afghanistan.
The power of non-State groups and regional military chiefs, and their tendency to
rely on threats and uses of force not controlled by any State, became more deeply
engrained than before in both Afghanistan and the frontier areas of Pakistan. The
religious element in Afghan politics-which was particularly prominent in the
struggle against Soviet influence, and was encouraged by the outside powers that
provided much- needed finance and weapons for the mujahiditl--did not disappear with the departure of Soviet forces in 1989. Indeed, within a few years religious warriors trained in the hard school of combat against Soviet forces in
Afghanistan were to turn up in a wide range of other locations, including in the former Yugoslavia.
These legacies of the war against Soviet control remain most important in
Afghanistan itself. The problems of non -State violence, regional rivalries and
the religious element in politics are not new to Afghanistan, but they were reinforced. Long-held suspicions toward certain types of fore ign presence remained
prominent.
II. The Wars in Afghanistan since 1989

The current multifaceted and complex situation in Afghanistan is best understood
as the continuation of a protracted war over the country's fu ture which began
many years before 200 I. Understanding its character is important not only for developing military and political policy in the country, but also fo r understanding its
likely impact on international security generally. There are funda mental differences of understanding about its nature.
Whether viewed as a war or a stabilization mission , there is a tendency to present the situation as a conflict between an essentially progressive cause represented by the Karzai government in Kabul on the one side, and two reactionary
lslamist forces on the other: the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This view may be too simple
in its views both of the Afghan government and of its opponents. Most strikingly,
it tends to overstate the effectiveness of the Afghan government. It also understates the importance of ethnic/linguistic divisions within Afghanistan, where the
largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns, constitutes over 40 percent of the population.
7
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Elements of Afghan and Pashtun nationalism playa significant part in the resistance to the Afghan government and its foreign backers. A review of the twenty
years' crisis in Afghanistan since the Soviet withdrawal, and of the place of Pakistan in that crisis, is necessary for an understanding of the nature of this war.
The Crisis since 1989
Following the withdrawal of the last Soviet forces from Afghanistan in January
1989, an internal crisis and war erupted. Indeed, the war within Afghanistan, always involving patrons around the region to sustain the war efforts of the parties,
can be traced back further, and can be said to have begun in about 1978.6 It has
never really ended. Throughout the two decades since 1989 there have been continuing regional rivalries and ongoing conflict between modernizers and Islamists.
There have been two moments when the conflict was viewed by some as having
ended-after the TaHban victory in September 1996 and after the Northern Alliance victory in December 2001.1 However, on both occasions the conflict continued in new forms .
This first phase of Afghanistan 's long-running war following the departure of
Soviet forces was only partially concluded on September 26, 1996 when Kabul fell
to the Taliban, which established a theocratic style of government throughout the
areas under their control and in 1997 renamed the country "' Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan." Then and thereafter the Northern Alliance continued to control an
area of northern Afghanistan and to challenge Taliban rule.
From October 7, 200 1 onward, following the al-Qaeda attacks in the United
States on September I I, direct US and coalition military intervention in Afghanistan changed the character of this continuing war. Of course it did not transform
the situation completely: resistant to change as ever, rival warlords sought to maintain their fiefdoms against intervention unless it could offer more by extending the
chance of collaboration. However, there was now an undeniably international war
inside Afghanistan. There was not much doubt that this was, for a few months, an
international war in the sense of a war between sovereign States-the US-led coalition versus the Taliban government of Afghanistan. In November-December 200 I
the US-led intervention, and the military campaign of the Northern Alliance, toppled the Taliban regime, which had been supported by al-Qaeda. This military action was widely, though not universally, viewed as a justifiable response to the
Taliban for having allowed Afghan territory to be used fo r preparing attacks on the
United States, and additionally had the effect of freeing Afghanistan from an unpopular regime. Initially there was much popular support in Kabul and elsewhere
for the incoming forces of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), but
this situation was to change.
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The international war of October-December 2001 had been superimposed on
two other more enduring conflicts: the non-international armed conflict of the
Taliban versus Northern Alliance, and the US-led struggle againstal-Qaeda terrorists. Both of these "other conflicts" continued. The war against al-Qaeda and related terrorists, who were now based in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan, carried on
without interruption. In addition, there was growing resistance in southern Afghanistan to the new regime. This insurgency began relatively slowly, so that its seriousness was not recognized for some time.
How should this resistance be characterized? It is commonly labeled as the
Taliban insurgency, a description which may conceal the possibilities that the
sources of support for the insurgency have been more numerous than the label
"Taliban" suggests, or that the ideology of the Taliban may have evolved. The insurgent movement has drawn on elements of both Afghan and Pashtun nationalism, it has operated alongside traditional forms of social organization and systems
of justice, its recruiting has been facili tated by Afghanistan's high levels of unemployment and by the fad that it is able to pay its soldiers, and its willingness to support poppy cultivation not only increases its acceptance in certain provinces but
also exposes the incoherence of the policies of the various NATO countries on this
issue.1I None of this is to suggest that all those forces labeled Taliban should be seen
simply as heroic patriots or as Pashtun traditionalists. Ahmed Rashid has written:
The United States and NATO have failed to understand that the Taliban beJong to
neither Afghanistan or Pakistan, but are a Iwnpen population, the product of refugee
camps, militarised madrassas, and the lack of opportunities in the borderland of
Pakistan and Afghanistan. They have neither been true citizens of either country nor
experienced traditional Pashtun tribal society. The longer the war goes on, the more
deeply rooted and widespread the Taliban and their transnational milieu will become. 9

Into this ongoing conflict a new element was added from 2005 onward: the involvement in combat activities of contingents of the NATO-led ISAF. The original
authorization oflSAF in 200 1 had been "to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in
the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan
Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a
secure environment."IO Initially, in January 2002, the United Kingdom took the
lead in organizing ISAF, followed at six- month intervals by other "lead States" until NATO as such took over in August 2003. ISAF's remit gradually extended across
Afghanistan and in some provinces came to involve direct combat. II By 2006 ISAF
comprised troops from thirty-two countries. Those deployed in the southern provinces of Afghanistan became increasingly geared to a counterinsurgency campaign.
This campaign had not been part of ISAF's original role: the transition to it,
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involving a gradual stretching of the initial mandate, resulted in some unavoidably
uneven burden-sharing between NATO member States. Thus NATO had put itself
in the unenviable position of staking its impressive reputation on the outcome of a distant and little-understood war in a country well known to be a graveyard for foreign
military adventures.
The problem is exacerbated by the limited nature of the involvement of outsidersmilitary and civilian-in Afghan society. In the years since 2001, both soldiers and
civilians have generally had short-term tours of duty. Few of them have learned the
relevant languages, and there is remarkably limited institutional memory, especially as regards knowledge of local communities and political traditions. Indeed,
on the civilian side there has been a conscious break from the experience of colonial
administration, which has meant, unfortunately, a break from understanding the
society's structure and the tangled history of its links with outsiders.
One special feature of the ongoing war in Afghanistan that distinguishes it from
certain other post-Cold War US involvements has been that the US-led forces had
at the start significant allies within the country: originally the Northern Alliance,
then the government of Afghanistan. This made the Afghan involvement different
from some of the other conflicts in which the United States has been involved,
including Iraq in the first years of the US-led presence and Somalia over a much
longer period, in neither of which were there strong local forces in place with
which to work.
However, this apparently favorable situation had inherent limitations and was
vulnerable to change. Even after its capture of Kabul in December 2001, the Northern Alliance, which at the best of times was an unstable coalition, never controlled
all of Afghanistan. The Afghan authorities conspicuously lacked the bureaucratic
backup that provides the essential underpinning of most governments around the
world. The Pashtuns generally resented the Northern Alliance's US-assisted victOI)'; and when, around 2003-04, the Pashtuns came back strongly in the government (thanks to the new constitution and law on political parties), Afghan opinion
critical of the United States found a voice. Indeed, the boot was now on the other
foot, with minorities complaining of Pashtun nationalism and structural exclusion. In short, the social foundations of the foreign presence in Afghanistan proved
to be weaker than they had first seemed in 200 1--02 .
In legal terms, there has been a tendency to focus attention on the question of
whether particular aspects and phases of the ongoing war in Afghanistan should be
characterized as "international," "non-international" or something else. The main
problem with debates on this topic is that the passion for pigeonholing risks obstructing understanding of a complex reality. Actually the wars in Afghanistan
have been all of these things. If one were forced to apply a single label to all their
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aspects, it would probably be "internationalized civil war," an under-explored but
important category of wars. Yet whichever of these terms is adopted has only limited relevance to, or effect on, policy making. Although technically it is true that
more rules apply to international war than to non-international armed conflict, in
this case most of the powers involved in the war do at some level recognize the need
for restraint in the conduct of the war, a matter discussed furth er below.
Th e Pakistani Factor
Afghanistan's neighbors-including China, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan-all have legitimate interests in the country and its long-running confli cts. Many other States, including India and Russia, also have legitimate interests
in whether Afghanistan can manage to stay together, make progress in development and attract refugees back. Of all the relationships with other States, that with
Pakistan is the most complex, and has contributed most to Afghanistan's ongoing
divisions.
All borders are artificial constructs created in peoples' minds. Thus in itself it is
hardly a remarkable statement to say that the border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan-the Durand Line imposed by the British on a reluctant Afghan government in 1893-is artificial. What is significant about this border is that Pashtuns
on either side of the line view it as artificial. This does not mean that they are
committed to a definite idea of a new state of " Pashtunistan" separate fro m both
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Rather it means that conflicts on either side of the line
immediately acquire a cross-border and therefore an international dimension.
What creates an issue, both for governments and peoples, is its chronic porousness, the existence of linked conflicts on both sides of it, the strength of the bonds
of common identity and experience that link Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the inherent weakness of both ofthese States. It is too simple to say that
the frontier areas of both States are ungovernable: they have their own systems of
authority, which leave little room for control by the State.
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which run along the
border with Afghanistan, remain almost completely outside the control of the Pakistani government, and have provided fertile ground for the exercise of dominance by the Taliban and al-Qaeda. They are a legacy of empire. The British had
also practiced containment, occasional chastisement and periodic negotiation; and
resistance meant that a fmal occupation was simply too expensive to justify in imperial terms. One remarkable feature of this situation is that successive Pakistani
governments have had no counterinsurgency policy in these areas. Occasional
sweeps and demonstrations offirepower are in no way substitutes for a serious policy aimed at gaining a degree of consent from the population or the powerbrokers.
II
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The United States has not used the power that ought to come with its generous
support for Pakistan to persuade it to adopt a strategy in these areas. The FATA
constitutes a haven for terrorists that is in some respects comparable to the one that
existed in Afghanistan before 200 1.
Overlapping with all this, and compounding the problem of relations between
the two countries, is the fact that opinion in Pakistan generally on matters relating
to the use offorce has never favored the US vision of the "War on Terror. " A BBC
World Service Poll in twenty-three countries, published in September 2008, when
asking respondents to indicate their feelings regarding al-Qaeda, found high levels
of support for it in Pakistan. This was combined with a mere 17 percent of Pakistanis stating that they had negative views of al-Qaeda, the lowest proportion ofrespondents in any of the countries polled. 12 However, this may reflect more a desire
to take an anti-US position than an acceptance of terrorist bombings. Indeed, in
four weeks in the autumn of2008 an anti-terror petition in Pakistan-"This is Not
Us"-attracted almost sixty-three million signatures in what is possibly the biggest
such lobbying effort anywhere in the world. i3 The responses to terrorist bombings
in Pakistan in early 2009 do not suggest general support for the acts of terrorists.
The Pakistani connection has deeply affected events in Afghanistan in all the
wars there since the Soviet intervention in 1979. Throughout, Pakistan's InterServices Intelligence has had a major, and not always controlled, role. In the 1980s
Pakistan, with massive Western support, provided crucial assistance for the antiSoviet rebels in Afghanistan. Then from 1994 onward there was extensive Pakistani
official support for the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. 14
In the ongoing war in Afghanistan a number of consequences in the security
field have flowed from the Pakistani connection. The first is that, since Pashtuns on
either side of the border are more likely than most others to view the Western military presence in Afghanistan as illegitimate, there is inevitably a transborder hinterland for the insurgency. Second, since Pashtuns playa large part in the Pakistan
Army-and in the Frontier Corps, which comes under the Ministry of Interiorthere are built-in difficulties in Pakistani government attempts to impose the
capital's rule by force on the various Pashtun-inhabited areas. IS AI; a consequence of
these two factors, the insurgency in southern Afghanistan is likely for the foreseeable
future to have safe base areas inside Pakistan. In sum, like so many border regions in
the world, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border presents excellent opportunities for the
organization and continuation of insurgency. The fluidity of the situation on both
sides of the border suggests that there are not two wars in the region, but one.
This creates the third consequence of the Pakistani connection: the strong pressure on US military leaders to take the war unilaterally into the territory of Pakistan . US policy toward Pakistan notoriously lacks strategic coherence.16 The fact
12

Adam Roberts
that the United States considers the Pakistani authorities unreliable, with certain
elements willing to pass on intelligence to US enemies, means that the US military
role on the territory of Pakistan cannot be based on dose military cooperation. As a
result, US military action in Pakistan is bound to be perceived as an infringement
of Pakistan's sovereignty. The US killings of Pakistani soldiers in several such incidents, and the strong reactions to this in Pakistan, confirmed the chaotic and inflammatory character of the situation. I? George Bush's presidential order of July
2008, authorizing US strikes in Pakistan without seeking the approval of the Pakistani government, while an understandable reaction to a troubling situation on the
border, risks further destabilizing a country that is a crucial if deeply flawed ally.IS
It is sobering to refle<:t that the Soviet Union, in the course of its counterinsurgency
operations in the 1990s, engaged in hundreds of cross-border strikes in Pakistan,
getting few if any results from them. 19

Ill. The Ma ny Roles of the Un ited Nations in Afghanistan since 1979
The United Nations has a long history of involvement in the conflicts in Afghanistan and such a continuing commitment there that failure would impact on the
UN's already tarnished reputation. There have been three main phases of UN involvement: during the Soviet war from 1979 to 1989, in the largely civil war of
1990-2001 and in the war since 200 1 that continues today.
UN Roles during the Soviet War in Afghanistan (1979-89)
During the Soviet war the main action was not in the Security Council: there the
Soviet Union could veto any direct UN involvement in the conflict, so the Council
referred the matter to the General Assembly under the UN's "Uniting for Peace"
procedure. 20 From then on the conflict was mainly handled in the General Assembly
and in the office of the Secretary-General. In January 1980 the General Assembly
called for "the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign
troops from Afghanistan."21 Subsequently, under the auspices of the SecretaryGeneral, the UN initiated a "good offices" function to assist negotiations involving
the Afghan and Soviet governments on the one hand, and Pakistan on the other.
This led eventually to the April 1988 Geneva Accords on Afghanistan, which were
a crucial landmark in the ending of the Cold War.22 Later in 1988 the UN Good
Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) was established. 23 This
was the first UN peacekeeping mission since the establishment of United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon in March 1978, evidence of the key part played by
Afghan events in the post-Cold War re-emergence of the UN.
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At the same time, the process of ending the Soviet involvement posed a classic
dilemma for the United Nations. The internal conflict presented the delicate q uestion
of the extent to which the United Nations, as an organization of governments,
could be seen to negotiate with rebel forces that were batding it out throughout the
country. As Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar put it in 1988, it would be
"against our philosophy to be in touch with the enemies of governments. "24 Yet
that is exactly what the United Nations started to do in the following year, in the attempt to facilitate a comprehensive political settlement and to set up a broad-based
government. In presenting the United Nations with this dilemma, the war in Afghanistan was truly characteristic of the post-O:lld War era. The UN's limited success in
persuading the parties to a largely internal conflict to agree to a peace settlement
would also be a harbinger of things to com e.
UN Roles in the Continuing Civil War (1990-2001)
The continuing civil war following the Soviet departure presented a difficult challenge for the United Nations. By March 1990 UNGOMAP, having completed its
key mission of observing the Soviet withdrawal, was wound up. Yet there was a
chaotic situation on which the Security Council, the General Assembly and the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General had remarkably little capacity to
influence events. The General Assembly established the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA) in 1993, in the distant hope of facilitating national rapprochement and reconstruction.25 The post of Special Representative for
Afghanistan, who headed the mission, was held successively by two of the ablest
and most experienced UN troubleshooters, Lakhdar Brahimi and Francese
Vendrell. However, they could achieve little in UNSMA's lifetime, which ended in
2001--02 .
At the same time the Security Council gradually became more actively involved
with Afghanistan. One month after the Taliban cam e to power in September 1996
the Council passed a resolution which staked out a number of critically important
positions. As well as stating its unsurprising conviction that " the United Nations,
as a universally recognized and impartial interm edial)', must continue to play the
central role in international efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the Afghan
conflict," it called for an immediate end to all hostilities, denounced the discrimination against girls and women, and called for an end to the practices that had
made the country a fertile ground for drug trafficking and terrorism.26 Then in August
1998, following an upsurge in the fighting between the Taliban and the Northern
Alliance, the Security Council passed a further resolution, again setting o ut some
useful principles. It noted that there was "a serious and growing threat to regional
and international peace and security, as well as extensive human suffering, further
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destruction, refugee flow and other forcible displacement of large numbers of people";
it expressed concern at "the increasing ethnic nature of the conflict"; it deplored
the fact that, despite numerous UN pleas, there was continuing foreign interference;
condemned the attacks on UN personnel in the Taliban-held areas; condemned the
Taliban's capture of the Iranian Consulate-General in Mazar-e-Sharif; reaffirmed
that "all parties to the conflict are bound to comply with their obligations under
international humanitarian law"; and demanded the Afghan factions "to refrain
from harboring and training terrorists and their organizations and to halt illegal
drug activities."27 In October 1999, it imposed sanctions on the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan: 2R arguably this decision undermined whatever was left of the UN's
good-offices mission. The Council may have been ineffective in the 1990s civil war
in Afghanistan, but it was certainly not asleep. Some of the positions that it had
staked o ut wo uld be important for the future , in that they provided a basis for
subsequent tough action against the Taliban and fo r serious efforts to rebuild the
Afghan State.
UN Roles in the War since Septem ber 200 1
The attacks on the United States on September 11,2001 were a dear indication of
the connection between Afghanistan and international security. In 1996 and 1998
the Council had warned of the terrorist danger in Afghanistan. Now it was to have a
more prominent role, giving implicit authorization to the US-led use of force, and
becoming deeply involved in the subsequent reconstruction of Afghanistan.
The most significant acts of the Council after 91l I took the form of two
resolutions which had profound implications for the management of international security issues. The first-Resolution 1368, passed the day after the attacksby recognizing " the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter" implicitly accepted the proposition that it could be lawful
for a State to take action against another State if the latter failed to stop terrorist
attacks being launched from its territory. The same resolution called on all States
to brin g the perpetrators to justice, and to coope rate to prevent and suppress
terrorist ads.29
In this Resolution the Council accepted that a right of self-defense could apply
to a State when it was attacked by a non-State entity. To those who believe that action
against terrorists should be confined to police methods, this was controversial.
However, the Resolution was passed in the specific and hopefully unique circumstances of9/11, when the Taliban regime was refusing to take any action against the
terrorists in their midst. The Resolution does not m ean that there is or should be
general Council approval of responding to terrorist attacks by cross-border military
actions, or that such action should generally be viewed as lawful. The history of
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such responses is dismal, as evidenced for example by the Hapsburg attempt to
wipe out the terrorist "hornets' nest" in Serbia in 19 14, and the various Israeli
counterterrorist operations in Lebanon in the past thirty years. The initial
effectiveness of the military campaign in Afghanistan in late 200 I appears to be
an exception to the proposition that it is unwise to attack States from which terror
originates, but in the aftennath the proposition has recovered some credibility. Yet
the resulting caution about military intervention is bound to face severe challenges
if State-sponsored or State-tolerated terrorism continues to be a major feature of
international politics.
The second key resolution passed by the Council in September 200 I, Resolution
1373, recognized "the need for States to complement international cooperation by
taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through all
lawful means, the fmancing and preparation of any acts of terrorism. n It then indicated the remarkable extent of such measures, and the key role of the Council in
overseeing them . It used strong language-the Council "decides that all states
shall n take action, rather than mere1y calling on them to do $0.30 The General Assembly-often wary of any increase in the Security Council's powers-was duly
nervous but did not go against the Council's approach.II It remains possible that in
the long run the greatest effect of Afghanistan on international security will be that
it compelled the Council to take on a more intrusive role in relation to States than
had ever previously been contemplated.
Yet the actual role of the Council in the events following the 9/ II attack was
limited. True, its resolutions and other actions were important for the international legitimacy of the US-led military action in Afghanistan and for the attempts
to build up a post-Taliban system of government there.32 However, there was no
way in which the Council could have been centrally involved in mustering and
commanding the military coalition that resulted in the dosing of the al-Qaeda
bases in Afghanistan and the removal of the Taliban from power in Kabul. The most
striking feature of the Council's role in the hostilities oflate 2001 is its limited
character.
Following the installation of the Karzai government in Kabul on December 22,
200 I, the two main tasks facing the new government and its outside backers were
perceived to be reconstruction and the provision of security. The United Nations
was widely seen--even by the US administration-as being pivotal in tackling
these tasks. The key statement of this period, which did much to define the role not
just of the United Nations but of the international community generally, was made
by Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan. In discussing the planned UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA),
he famo usly said: "It will be an integrated mission that will operate with a 'light
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footprint,' keeping the international United Nations presence to the minimum required, while our Afghan colleagues are given as much of a role as possible. ")3
This immediately raises the question of whether a light footprint is indeed possible in a country with such a limited-and distrusted-State structure as that of
Afghanistan. The concept was inevitably buffeted by events and modified to the
point where some did not recognize it. Within a year or two a reviving insurgency,
and major military operations on Afghan territory by the United States and NATO,
created the dual risks that the footprint would be perceived as heavy and that
UNAMA would be seen as powerless to implement important parts of its mandate.
It was not the only part of the UN system that faced the problem of appearing to be
partial, or powerless, or both. As Gilles Dorronsoro has pointed out in a critical
survey of the Security Council's roles in Afghanistan up to the end of2006, "the direct involvement by Permanent Members of the Security Council in a counterinsurgency war has resulted in the Council being silent on specific violations of
international humanitarian law.").!
In the years since 2002 in which it has operated in Afghanistan, UNAMA has
sought to assist political and economic transition and the rule oflaw. The report of
its activities up to March 2008 presented a sobering picture:
[TJhe political transition continues to face serious challenges. The Taliban and related
armed groups and the drug economy represent fundamental threats to still-fragile
political, economic and social institutions. Despite tactical successes by national and
international military forces, the anti-Government elements are far from defeated.
Thirty-six out of 376 districts, including most districts in the east, south-east and
south, remain largely inaccessible to Mghan officials and aid workers.... Meanwhile,
poor governance and limited development efforts, particularly at the provincial and
district levels, continue to result in political alienation that both directly and indirectly
sustains anti-Government elements. 3S

IV. Fitting Military Doctrine and Practice to Afghan Realities
The limitations of military doctrines and practice are often exposed, not by
arguments, but by events. Thus it was mainly events in Iraq and Afghanistan
that exposed the inadequacies of the so-called "revolution in military affairs," an
idea that was popular in the United States from the mid-I990s until at least
2003. 36 Afghanistan was always likely to be a difficult theater of operations for
outside military forces. Seeing this (and perhaps also because he did not want an
ongoing distraction from the future invasion of Iraq, for which he was already
lobbying) Paul Wolfowitz said in November 2001, "In fact, one of the lessons of
Afghanistan's history, which we've tried to apply in this campaign, is if you're a
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foreigner , try not to go in. If you go in, don't stay too long, because they don' t
tend to like any foreigners who stay too long. "37
Many problems have been encountered in implementing and adapting military
doctrine and practice in face of Afghan realities. Three issues considered here are
the role of airpower, the complexities of operating in an alliance framework, and
the appropriateness or otherwise of COIN doctrine. The first two are touched on
here briefly: more attention is paid to the third. Many key d evelopments, of considerable relevance to containing the insurgency, canno t be covered: they include particularly the key role of the Afghan National Police.
Airpower in Afghanistan
Ever since October 2001 airpower (which m ainly m eans US airpower) has played
an im portant part in military operations in Afghanistan. The apparent success of
the use of airpower in October-December 200 1 was deceptive: a major fac tor in
the Taliban's defeat was the advance of ground forces-those of the Northern Alliance. Since then, the role of airpower in the Afghan conflict has been a subject of
contestation, principally between the Army and Marines o n the o ne hand, and
the US Air Force on the other. A key issue has been whether airpower is a major
instrumen t in its own right, or is mainly useful in supporting ground forces. Selfevidently, the US and NATO ground forces in Afghanistan, widely dispersed and
few in number, freque ntly need airpower in support of their ground operations.
Indeed, tactical air support has been vital to an y success they have had, and has
often saved the small numbers oflSAF forces from being overwhelmed. In military terms, a "light footprint" on the ground inevitably means a heavy air
presence.
Those planning coalition m ilitary operations in Afghanistan have shown awareness of the dangers of reliance on airpower, especially of the adverse consequences
of killing civilians. On occasion they have even claimed to have set an aim of no civilian casualties. 38 While this aim actually goes furthe r than the strict requiremen ts
of existing law applicable in an international armed conflict, in practice it has not
been achieved. Part of the difficulty is that the very definition of civilian is problematic in a war such as that in Afghanistan. In addition, many other factors have
prevented realization of the aim of no civilian casualties: shortage of ground forces,
different approaches o f individual commanders, poor intelligence, the heat of battle, weapons malfunction, the co-location of military targets and civilians, and the
frayed relationship between ground and air forces operating in Afghanistan. 39 A
Human Rights Watch report in September 2008 summarized the situation thus:
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In the past three years, the armed confl ict in Afghanistan has intensified, with daily
fighting between the Taliban and other anti-government insurgents against Afghan
government fo rces and its international military supporters. The US, which operates in
Afghanistan th rough its counter-insurgency forces in Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) and as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), has
increasingly relied on airpower in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism
operations. The combination of light ground forces and overwhelming airpower has
become the dominant doctrine of war for the US in Afghanistan. The result has been
large numbers of civilian casualties, controversy over the continued use of airpower in
Afghanistan, and intense criticism of US and NATO fo rces by Afghan political leaders
and the general public.

As a result of OEF and ISAF airstrikes in 2006, 116 Afghan civilians were killed in 13
bombings. In 2007, Afghan civilian deaths were nearly th ree times higher:: 321 Afghan
civilians were killed in 22 bombings, while hundreds more were injured. In 2007, mo re
Afghan civilians were killed byairstrikes than by US and NATO ground fi re. In the first
seven months of2008, the latest period for which data is available, at least 119 Afghan
civilians were killed in 12 airstrikes.40
Th at las t figure needed to be increased when it was reveaJed in October 2008
that thirty-three civilians had been killed in a single US airstrike on August 22.
Such in cidents d o serious damage to the coalition cause. Largely as a result of the
long history of such incidents, there h as been a strong anti-coalition reaction.
Already in 2006 the Afghan parliam ent had dem onstrated its concern abo ut coaJition m ilitary actions, and such expressio ns of concern have sub sequently become
m ore frequent. Mean wh ile, P resident Hamid Karzai, wh ose authority has been
dimin ishin g, has made a number of criticisms of the coalition fo rces, calling for an
end to civilian casualties, an d even stating that he wanted US fo rces to stop arresting suspected Taliban m embers an d their supporters.4 !
The NATO Framework
From 2001 on ward th e United States has operated in Afghanistan with coalition
partners and, especially since August 2003, with th e fo rmal involvement of NATO.
Ind eed , in Afghanistan NATO is involved in gro und comb at operations for the first
time in its history-far from its nonnal area of responsibility and again st a threat
very d ifferent from the on e it had been created to face. The NATO involvement in
Afghanistan is widely, but perhaps no t w isely, viewed as "a test of the allian ce's
political will and military capab ilities. "42 It is an exceptionaJly h ard tes t. Indeed, the
implication that the future of the alliance h angs on this tes t is reminiscen t of earlier
views that US credibility was on the line in Vietnam.
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NATO's involvement in Afghanistan is in sharp contrast to its conduct during
the Cold War. In that period it repeatedly and studiously avoided involvement in
colonial confli cts-the French wars in Indochina and Algeria, the Portuguese wars
in Africa, the British in Malaya, the Dutch in Indonesia and so on. Its individual
members were involved in these, but the alliance was not. NATO also avoided involvement in postcolonial conflicts or, as in Cyprus,limited itself to an essentially
diplomatic role. Now in Afghanistan, which has all the hallmark fea tures of postcolonial States undergoing conflict---especially the lack of legitimacy of the constitutional system, government and frontiers-NATO became engaged, all with little
public debate.
The NATO role in Afghanistan began in a problematic way, and so it has continued. On September 12,2001, the day after the 9/11 attacks, the NATO Council
stated:
If it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it
shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which
states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them al1. 43

When the United States gave this offer the brush -off, preferring to have a "coalition
a la carte" in which there would be no institutional challenge to its leadership, there
was disappointment and irritation in Europe. The war in Afghanistan in OctoberDecember 2001, while it was effectively cond ucted under US leadership, was also
one chapter in the story of the declining size of US-led wartime coalitions.
However, NATO rapidly came back into the picture, not least because the
United States came to recognize the need for long-term assistance in managing societies that had been freed from oppressive regimes by US uses of force . NATO has
been directly involved in Afghanistan at least since August 9, 2003, when it took
formal control of the International Security Assistance Force, which had originally
been established under UK leadership in January 2002 . It was in the autwnn of
2003 that an upsurge of violence began as part of a deteriorating security
situation.44 Since 2006 ISAF has undertaken an expanded range of responsibilities
in Afghanistan, involving combat as well as peacekeeping, in an expanded area that
includes provinces in which conflict is ongoing.
ISAF's notably broad UN Security Council mandate involves it in a wide range
of activities, including military and police training. Many of its activities are carried out through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)-c:ivilian-military
units of varying sizes designed to extend the authority of the central government,
provide security and undertake infrastructure projects. There are twenty-six PRTs
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in twenty-six of the country's thirty-four provinces. Operating under different
lead States, with twelve of the twenty-six led by the United States, the PRTs' resources and tasks have varied greatly.
Not surprisingly, there have been controversies about numerous aspects of the
overall ISAF mission. Pour key problems concern the coherence or otherwise of the
policies of the different members of ISAF, the problematic command and control
arrangements, differences over detainee treatment, and the difficulty of raising
forces.
The lack of coherence of the approaches taken by different foreign forces in
ISAF and their governments at home is evident. Different contributing States have
different visions of ISAP's role. The most obvious difference is that the United
States, United Kingdom and Canada tend to see it, albeit with some variations
within each of these countries, as a stability operation, encompassing counterinsurgency actions, while Germany and some others see it more through the lens of a
peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission. These positions are not polar opposites,
and each may have validity in different provinces of Afghanistan, but the dash of
perspective on this issue does not assist cooperation of forces in difficult operations. Daniel Marston has gone so far as to conclude: "As of 2007, the main problem impeding coalition forces' successful application of counterinsurgency was
decentralization of responsibility. "45
The complexity of the command and control arrangements in Afghanistan is
greater than that in past counterinsurgency campaigns. Debates about this have inevitably reflected the US desire that more contingents in ISAF should become directly involved in combat operations, and the concern of some contributors that
this should not happen. Although ISAF is now under a US commander, and the
continuous rotation of senior posts is ceasing, the arrangements for coordinating
the work of these distinct forces continue to pose problems. 46
The important, and scandal-ridden, matter of treatment of detainees is another
issue on which there are differences of approach. Anxious not to be associated with
shocking US statements and practices in this matter, and insufficiently staffed and
equipped to hold on to the prisoners they capture, other NATO members have
drawn up separate agreements with the Afghan authorities embodying a variety of
different approaches to how they should be treated once in Afghan hands. There
are serious concerns that some detainees handed over to the Afghan authorities on
this basis have been maltreated. 47
The provision of forces in the numbers required for ISAF has been a highly
contentious matter within NATO States. The coalition of forces acting in support
of the Afghan government consists of three basic elements. The first is the Afghan
National Army which has been largely re-created in this decade with the help of
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the United States and other NATO countries. With a manpower level of over seventy thousand, its relatively modest size has led to US accusations that the Afghan
government has been slow in building up its army. The second is ISAF, which now
comprises some 51,350 troops from forty NATO and non-NATO countries.
Much the largest contingents are those of the United States, with 19,950 troops,
and the United Kingdom, with 8,745. The third basic element is the force of well
over ten thousand troops (almost all of them American) who are part of the US
Operation Enduring Freedom, which focuses particularly on the counterterrorist
mission in Afghanistan.~8 Granted the scale of the problems in Afghanistan, all
these numbers are widely seen as low, yet in many NATO mem ber States there is a
reluctance to increase the commitment. O pinion polls in five NATO member
States with a high level of involvement in Afghanistan show the public to be highly
skeptical about it ..f9 An increase in such numbers risks running into opposition in
many NATO States, and also further antagonizing Afghan opinion. If counterin surgency theory is a guide, and the whole country was seen as a theater of war, a
massive increase in such numbers would seem to be called for.
So how reliable a guide is the writing on counterinsurgency?
Counterinsurgency Doctrines and Practice
Contrary to m )1.h, counterinsurgency campaigns can sometimes be effective. Doctrines and practices of counterinsurgency-the best of which draw on a wide and
varied range of practice-have a long history. so The revival of COIN doctrine in the
past few years has been driven primarily by events in Iraq, but also, if to a lesser degree, by the development of the insurgency in Afghanistan. This revival of COIN
doctrine is hardly surprising. The response of adversaries to the extraordinary pattern of US dominance on the battlefield was always going to be one of unconventional warfare, including the methods of the guerrilla and the terrorist; and , in
turn, the natural US counter-response was to revive the most obviously appropriate available body of military doctrine.
The key document of the US revival of COIN doctrine is the US Army Field
Manual 3-24 {FM 3_24).51 It is very much an Army and Marine Corps manual: the
Air Force refused to collaborate in the exercise. Improbably for a military-doctrinal
document, it has been in demand in the United States. It has been heavily accessed
and downloaded on the web, is also available as a published book from a major university press52 and was the ftrs t army publication to receive a review in the New
York Times. 53 Although it has some flaws, explored further below, it is a significant
contribution to COIN literature.
By contrast, the United Kingdom has not yet produced a major new manual.
This is partly because, much more than their US counterparts, the British had
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extant doctrine.$4lt is also because there was some opposition to COIN doctrine
on the grounds that it would result in the same hammer being used on every problem. As a result there has not yet been a UK equivalent ofFM 3-24. The Ministry of
Defence's short (23 pages) Joint Discussion Note of}anuary2006, The Compre},ensive Approach, is a more general survey intended to be relevant to a wide range of
operations: the word "counterinsurgency" does not appear in it. 55 Jt was followed
in 2007 by a paper entitled Countering Irregular Activity.56 This docwnent, which
has not gone into general public circulation and has not been greeted with enthusiasm in the army, "seeks to instruct military personnel about counterinsurgency as
a whole and about associated threats, and emphasizes the need for military activity
to be part of a comprehensive approach involving all instruments of power. "57 This
summary, by Sir John Kiszely, until 2008 Director of the Defence Academy of the
United Kingdom, is immediately followed by a down-to-earth reminder that "every insurgency is sui generis, making generalizations problematic.":;S This important point has been emphasized by military professionals on both sides of the
Atlantic.
The "comprehensive approach," which is central to both the US and UK doctrines, essentially means the application of all aspects of the power of the State
within the territory where the insurgency is being fought. The apparent assumption that there is a State with real power is the key weakness of the approach, espedally as it applies to Afghanistan. Before exploring this in more detail, it may be
useful to glance at the problematic nature of assumptions about the political realm
in the counterinsurgency doctrines inherited from past eras.
The US manual revives and updates doctrines that were developed in the Cold
War years in response to anti-colonial insurrections (some of them involving leadership by local communist parties). It relies especially heavily on two sources from
that era.59 The first is David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare, one of the better
writings of the French thinkers on guerre revolutionnaire. 60 Th e second is Sir Robert
Thompson's Defeating Communist Insurgency.61 Both works had placed emphasis
on protecting populations as distinct from killing adversaries-a crucial distinction which implies a need for high force levels.
According to the introduction, FM 3-24 aspires to "help prepare Arm y and Marine Corps leaders to conduct COIN operations anywhere in the world."62 This
might seem to imply a universalist approach, but the authors emphasize that each
insurgency is different. The foreword by Generals Petraeus and Amos is emphatic
on this point: "You cannot fight former Saddamists and Islamic extremists the
same way you would have fought the Viet Cons. Moros or Tupamaros; the application of principles and fundamentals to deal with each varies considerably."61 FM
3-24 is also emphatic on the importance of constantly learning and adapting in
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response to the intricate environment of COIN operations, a point which strongly
reflects British experience. 64
Past exponents of COIN doctrine have generally placed heavy emphasis on
achieving force ratios of about twenty to twenty-five counterinsurgents for every
one thousand residents in an area of operations. Noting this, the manual states:
"Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum
troop density required fo r effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed
ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation. "65 This emphasis on force ratios is controversial. In any case, in Afghanistan there appears little
chance of achieving such numbers. If the entire country with its thirty-two million
inhabitants were to be viewed as the area of operations, a staggering eight hundred
thousand counterinsurgentscould be needed .66 Even if the area of operations is defined narrowly, and even allowing for the fad that not all have to be NATO troops,
the prospects of getting dose to the force ratio indicated m ust be low.
A flaw in some, b ut not all, past counterinsurgency doctrine has been a lack of
sensitivity to context and, in some cases, an ahistorical character. Some specialists
in counterinsurgency have seen their subject more as a struggle of light versus
darkness than as a recurrent theme of history or an outgrowth of the problems of a
society. Examples of such an ahistorical approach to the subject can be fo und in the
French group of theorists writing in the 1950s and early 1960s about guerre
revolutiOtltlaire. Some of these theorists denied the complexities--especially the
mixture of material, moral and ideological facto rs-that are keys to understanding
why and how guerrilla and terrorist movements come into existence. Colonel
Lacheroy, a leading figure in this group and head of the French Army's Service
d'Actiotl Psychologique, famously stated: "In the beginning there is nothing."67 Terrorism was seen as having been introduced deliberately into a peaceful society by
an omnipresent outside force--namely international communism. It is a demonological vision of a cosmic struggle in which the actual history of particular countries and ways of thinking has little or no place.
A related fault in some counterinsurgency writing was the tendency to distil
general rules of counterinsurgency from particular struggles and then seek to apply
them in radically different circumstances. The campaign in Malaya in the 1950s,
because it was successful in ending a communist-led insurgency, was often upheld
as a model, and is described favorably in the US Field Manual.68 Certain lessons
drawn partly from Malaya were subsequently applied by the British in Borneo and
Oman with some effect. However, successes such as that in Malaya can be great deceivers. Attempts were made to apply the lessons of Malaya in South Vietnam in
the 1960s.69 These largely failed. The main reason fo r fail ure in South Vietnam was
that conditions in Vietnam were utterly different from those in Malaya. In Malaya
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the insurgency had mainly involved the ethnic Chinese minority and had never
managed to present itself convincingly as representing the totality of the inhabitants of Malaya. The insurgency was weakened by the facts that the Chinese minority was distinguishable from other segments of society; Malaya had no common
frontier with a communist State, so infiltration was difficult; and the British granting of independence to Malaya undermined the anti-colonial credentials of the insurgents. In South Vietnam, by contrast, the communist insurgents had strong
nationalist credentials, having fought for independence rather than merely having
power handed to them by a departing colonial power.1° At the heart ofthe US tragedy in Vietnam was a fa ilure to recognize the unique circumstance of the case, that
in Vietnam, more than any other country in Southeast Asia, communism and nationalism were inextricably intertwined.
One lesson that could have been drawn from the Malayan case is that it is sometimes necessary to withdraw to win . FM 3-24 places much emphasis on the fact that
the United States withdrew from Vietnam in 1973 only to see Saigon fall to North
Vietnamese forces in 1975. 71 It does not notea contrary case: it was the UK promise
to withdraw completely-a promise that was followed by the Federation of Malaya's independence in 1957-that contributed to the defeat of the insurgency in
Malaya.72 The value of such promises needs to be taken into account in contemporary COIN efforts and indeed COIN theory. This is especially so, as the idea that the
United States intended to stay indefinitely in Iraq and Afghanistan, as evidenced by
the networks of bases built there, had a corrosive effect in both countries and more
generally. The decision of the Iraqi cabinet on November 16, 2008 that all US forces
will withdraw from Iraq by 2011 is evidence that a guarantee of withdrawal is seen
as a necessary condition (and not simply a natural consequence) of ending an acute
phase of insurgency.
One weakness in the US manual, likely to be remedied in any future revisions, is
the lack of serious coverage of systems of justice, especially those employed by the
insurgents themselves. The references to judicial systems in FM 3-24 are brief and
anodyne, almost entirely ignoring the challenge posed by insurgents in this area. 73
Insurgencies commonly use their own judicial procedures to reinforce their claims
to be able to preserve an existing social order or create a better one. The Taliban
have always placed emphasis on provision of a system of Islamic justice?4 In the
current conflict, taking advantage of the fact that the governmental legal system is
weak and corrupt, they have done this effectively in parts of Afghanistan.
This leads to a more general criticism. In addressing the problem of undermining and weakening insurgencies, both traditional COIN theory and its revived versions in the twenty-first century place emphasis on, but do not discuss in detail, the
role of State institutions: political structures, the administrative bureaucracy, the
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police, the courts and the armed forces. The institutions are often taken for
granted, and assumed to be strong. Indeed, the current British COIN doctrine
stemmed from a project started in 1995 to capture the lessons and doctrine from
Northern Ireland. A common criticism of much CO IN practice is that it was enthusiastically pursued by over-powerful and thuggish States, especially in Latin
America. 7s
Today, COIN theories risk being out of touch with the realities of assisting the
so-called "failed States" and "transitional administrations" of the twenty-first
century. These problems are not new; one of the problems that undermined US
COIN efforts in Vietnam was the artificiality and weakness of the coup-prone State
of South Vietnam. Yet the central fact must be faced that in the two test-beds of the
new COIN doctrines of recent years, Iraq and Afghanistan, State institutions have
been notoriously weak-in Iraq temporarily, and in Afghanistan chronically. Indeed,
in postcolonial States generally, where insurgencies are by no means uncommon,
indigenous State systems tend to be fragile and/or contested. The role of the State
in people's lives, and in their consciousness, may be thoroughly peripheral or even
negative. 76 So when the US manual speaks of "a comprehensive strategy employing
all instruments of national power" and stresses that all efforts focus on "supporting
the local populace and HN [host nation [ government,"" it is necessary to remind
ourselves that support for government is not exactly a natural default position for
inhabitants of countries with such tragic histories as Iraq and Afghanistan. O n the
other hand, General Petraeus worked on the manual after completing two tours of
duty in Iraq, with an eye to applying it there, and then did so to some effect when he
was commander of Multinational Force-Iraq. In 2008 the Iraqi government is
looking stronger than in the first years after the invasion. The fact that a government is weak in the face of an insurgency does not mean that it is necessarily fated
to remain so.
Of the many critiques of the US revival of COIN doctrine, one of the most
searching is an American Political Science Association review symposium published
in June 2008.78 Stephen Biddle of the US Council on Foreign Relations queried the
manual's fundamental assumption when he stated that
it is far from clear that the manual's central prescription of drying up an insurgent's
support base by persuading an uncommitted population to side with the government
makes much sense in an identity war where the government's ethnic or sectarian
identification means that it will be seen as an existential th reat to the security of rival
internal groups, and where there may be little or no supracommunal, national identity
to counterpose to the subnational identities over which thewar is waged by the time the
United States becomes involved 79
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Biddle also pointed out that the US manual has little to say about the comparative
merits of waging COIN with large conventional forces as against small commando
detachments, on the relative utility of air power in COIN, and on the willingness
of democracies to support COIN over a long period. Further, the manual does
not fit particularly well the realities of Iraq, where the insurgencies are far more
regional and localized in character, and more fickle in their loyalties, than were
many of the communist and anti-colonial insurgencies of earlier eras. As Biddle
points out, the negotiation oflocal ceasefires between insurgents and US commanders has been of key importance in lraq.80 Such webs of local ceasefires,
valuable despite their fragility, do not come from counterinsurgency doctrine.
These criticisms are another way of saying what General Petraeus knows: that all
doctrine is interim, and some parts are more interim than others.
The need to adapt doctrine, so evident in Iraq, applies even more strongly to
Afghanistan, a subject about which the US manual says remarkably little.81The key
issue is whether the revival of counterinsurgency doctrine really offers a useful guide
in a situation where there are some distinct elements in the insurgencies, where
negotiation with some of the insurgents may have a role and where the State does
not command the same loyalty or obedience that more local forces may enjoy.
After a difficult year in 2008, the US and Afghan governments began to place increased emphasis on local social structures. The US ambassador to Afghanistan
said at the end of the year that there was agreement to move forward with two programs: first, the community outreach program, "designed to create community
shuras" (local councils); and second, the community guard program, which is
"meant to strengthen local communities and local tribes in their ability to protect
what they consider to be their traditional homes." 82 While neither program was
well defmed, the move in this direction was evidence of willingness to rely on a less
State-based approach than hitherto.
Judging Progress in the War in Afghanistan
Judging progress in counterinsurgency wars is by nature a contentious task, and
involves difficult questions about the appropriate methodologies. Sometimes unorthodox methods of analysis yield the most valuable answers. The war in French
Indochina from 1946 to 1954 provided a classic case. When a French doctoral student,
Bernard Fall ( 1926-67), went to Vietnam in 1953, the French authorities claimed
that the war was going well, and showed maps and statistics indicating that they
controlled a large proportion of the territory. But he soon realized that French
claims about the amount of territory they controlled were exaggerated, or at least
lacked real meaning as far as the conduct of government was concerned. He reached
this conclusion both by visiting Vietminh-held areas, and by inspecting tax records
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in supposedly government-held areas: these latter showed a dramatic collapse in
the payment of taxes, and thus indicated a lack of actual government control.83 In
Afghanistan, the long-standing lack of a tax collection system continues today. AJ;
AJ;tri Suhrke has shown, taxation constitutes a uniquely small proportion-in
2005 it was only 8 percent---of all estimated income in the national budget. 84
By one key measure serious progress may appear to be being made in the Afghan
war. The numbers of refugee returns to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban regime at the end of2001 are one possible indicator of a degree of progress. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which
played a key part in the process, between January 1,2002 and December 31, 2007 a
total of 4,997,455 refugees returned to Afghanistan, as follows:
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

1,957,958

645,864

879,780

752,084

387,917

373,852

This is the largest refugee return in the world in a generation. It is striking that
even in 2006, 2007 and 2008, years of considerable conflict in parts of Afghanistan,
the returns continued, if at a reduced rate. In the whole period 2002-07, the overwhelming majority of refugees have been in two countries: Iran, from which 1.6
million returned, and Pakistan, from which 3.3 million returned. 85 Impressive as
the figures of this return are, four major qualifications have to be made:
• First, they have to be understood against the backdrop of the sheer numbers
of Afghan refugees: at the end of 2007 Afghanistan was still the leading country of
origin of refugees worldwide, with 3. 1 million remaining outside the country.
Thus in 2008, even after these returns, Afghan refugees constitute 27 percent of
the entire global refugee population.
• Second, not all returns were fully voluntary. Within the countries of asylum
there have been heavy pressures on these refugees to return, including the dosing
of some camps.
• Third, the experience of many returning refugees has induded lack of
employment opportunities in Afghanistan, and in some cases involvemen t in
property disputes. There has been mismanagement and corruption in the Afghan
Ministry of Refugees and Returnees. Some returnees live in dire conditions in
makeshift settlements. All this has created much disappointment, bitterness and
anti-government feeling.
• Fourth, displacement continues. In the past two years unknown numbers of
returnees have left the country again. Also the number of internally displaced
persons (IDPs) within Afghanistan has increased, especially due to the fighting in
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the south of the country, and now stands at about 235,000. Some returnees have
seamlessly become IDPs.86
Other developments confirm this sobering picture. The Afghan army remains
relatively small, and highly dependent on outside support. As for the insurgent
forces, they appear to have no shortage of recruits. Large nwnbers of fighters are
able to cross into Afghanistan, mainly from Pakistan; and the Taliban can also
employ many locals, especially in seasons when other work is in short supply. The
fact that the estimated unemployment rate is 40 percent means that insurgents
continue to have opportunities for recruitment. In Kabul and other cities, terrorist
attacks, once rare, have become common. Serious observers reported an atmosphere of disappointment and bitterness in Afghanistan in 2008.87
The UN Secretary-General's report of September 2008 swnmarizes the situation thus:
The overall situation in Afghanistan has become more challenging since my previous
report Despite the enhanced capabilities of both the Afghan National Army and the
international forces, the security situation has deteriorated markedly. The influence of
the insurgency has expanded beyond traditionally volatile areas and has increased in
provinces neighboring Kabul Incidents stemming from cross-border activities from
Pakistan have increased significantly in terms of numbers and sophistication. The
insurgency's dependence on asymmetric tactics has also led to a sharp rise in the
number of civilian casualties. Civilians are also being killed as a result of military
operations carried out by Afghan and international security forces, in particular in
situations in which insurgents conceal themselves in populated areas. Another
worrying development is the fact that attacks on aid-related targets and nongovernmental organizations have become more frequent and more deadly.88

The Secretary-General's report states bluntly that the number of security incidents rose to 983 in August 2008, the highest since the fall of the Taliban in 2001,
and "represents a 44 percent increase compared with the same month in 2007." It
also states: "While the main focus of the insurgency remains the southern and
eastern parts of the country, where it has historically been strong, insurgent influence has intensified in areas that were previously relatively calm, including in the
provinces closest to Kabul. "89 Overall the report is far from negative. It reports
some successes in the campaign against poppy cultivation, and it strongly endorses the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, adopted at the Paris Conference in Support of Afghanistan, held on June 12,2008. However, as an account
of the state of progress in the war against the Taliban, it confirms the picture
which has also been depicted by other sources. The latter include the sober report
of General David McKiernan, the top US commander in Afghanistan, who, at the
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same time as he was seeking specific troop increases, rejected simple notions, indeed the terminology, of a military "surge";90 and the US National Intelligence
Estimate on Afghanistan, a draft version of which was leaked in October 2008,
which stated that the situation there was in a "downward spiral."9\ One grim statistic of the downward spiral is the casualty rate of ISAF and Operation Enduring
Freedom forces in Afghanistan. Fatalities have increased each year from 57 in
2003 to 296 in 2008.92
As so often in counterinsurgency wars, the most useful assessments may be
those of independent witnesses who, just as Bernard Fall did in French Indochina,
have deep knowledge of a society and a healthy open-mindedness about the contribution that outside forces can make to security. Rory Stewart, who walked across
Afghanistan in 2002, and later retired from the UK diplomatic service to run a
charitable foundation in Kabul, has argued that "we need less investment-but a
greater focus on what we know how to do." He is specifically critical of increases in
forces:
A troop increase is likely to inflame Afghan nationalism because Afghans are more
anti-foreign than we acknowledge and the support for our presence in the insurgency
areas is declining. The Taliban, which was a largely discredited and backward
movement, gains support by portraying itself as fighting for Islam and Afghanistan
against a foreign military occupation. »9)

v. Conclusions
Four kinds of conclusions follow. First, about the implications of Afghanistan for
the UN; second, on the role of NATO; third, on international security generally;
and finally, on the debate about policy choices that is em erging from the difficult
experience of attempting to transform Afghanistan. These conclusions are based
on the presumption that the present campaign in Afghanistan is unlikely to result
in a clear victory for the Kabul government and its outside partners, because the
sources of division within and around Afghanistan are just too deep, and the tendency to react against the presence of foreign forces too ingrained. The war could
yet be lost, or, perhaps more likely, it could produce a stalemate ora long warof attrition with no clear outcome. The dissolution of Afghanistan into regional
fiefdoms-already an accustomed part of life--could continue and even
accelerate.
To some it may appear remarkable that Afghanistan has not reverted more
completely to type as a society that rejects outside intrusion. Part of the explanation
may be that this is not the only natural "default position" for Afghans: there have

30

Adam Roberts
also been countless episodes in which Afghan leaders have sought, and profited
from, alliances with outsiders. A second fac tor is the "light footprint" advocated by
Brahimi: for all the limitations of this approach, and the many departures from it
since it was enunciated in 2002 with specific reference to UNAMA, no one has convincingly suggested a better one. A third factor is that-notwithstanding the disastrous killings of civilians as a result of using airpower-there has been a degree of
restraint in the use of armed force: this has been important in at least slowing the
pace of the process whereby the US and other outside forces come to be perceived
as alien bodies in Afghanistan. The interesting phenomenon of application of certain parts of the law of armed conflict-namely the rules of targeting-as if this was
an international war is part of this process.
The United Nations
A few conclusions on the UN 's various roles in Afghanistan flow from this brief
survey. First, the United Nations has some remarkable achievements to its credit in
Afghanistan. It helped to negotiate the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan that
was completed in 1989; ever since then it has remained engaged on the ground in
Afghanistan; it gave a degree of authorization to the US-led effort to remove the
Taliban regime in 200 1; it has authorized ISAF and has provided a legitimate basis
for its expanded roles throughout the country; it has been involved in the many
subsequent efforts to help develop Afghanistan, not least by assisting in the various
elections held there since 2001; and it has assisted the largest refugee return to any
country since the 1970s.
Second, despite these achievements, the UN's roles have been more limited than
those of the United States and its various partners, especially in matters relating to
security. The fact that the UN's role in this crisis has been modest is not especially
shocking. Neither the terms of the UN Charter nor the record of the Security
Council justifies the excessively high expectations that many have had in respect to
the Council's roles. It was always a mistake to view the United Nations as aiming to
provide a complete system of collective security even in the best of circwnstances,
and circumstances in and around Afghanistan are far from being favo rable for international involvement.
Third, international legitimacy is never a substitute for local legitimacy. The
Council's acceptance of regime change in Afghanistan was justified once the
Taliban had refused to remove al-Qaeda, and did much to legitimize the aim of regime replacement, which could otherwise have seemed a narrowly neo-colonial US
action. Yet there is a danger that such international conferrals of legitimacy can
contribute to a failure to address the no-less-important question of securing
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legitimacy in the eyes of the audience that matters most: in this case, the peoples of
Afghanistan and neighboring countries.

NATO
The involvement of the NATO alliance in this distant, difficult and divisive conflict
could have fateful consequences for the alliance. It is truly remarkable that the reputation of the longest-lived military alliance in the world, comprised of States with
fundamentally stable political systems, should have made itself vulnerable to the
o utcome of a war in the unpromising surroundings of Afghanistan . There is much
nervousness about this among NATO's European members, and this may explain
the reluctance of European leaders to make the kind of ringing statements that often accompany war. Knowing that the outcome of any adventure in Afghanistan is
bound to be uncertain, they have wisely kept the level of rhetoric low.
There may be another reason for the reluctance of many leaders of European
member States to make strong endorsements of their participation in the war in
Afghanistan. Many of the claims that can be made in favor of the Afghan cause are
also implicitly c riticisms of the involvem ent in Iraq. From the start in 200 1, the USled involvement in Afghanistan and the subsequent involvement ofISAF have both
had a strong basis of international legitimacy that was reflected in Security Council
resolutions. In Afghanistan there was a real political and military force to support,
in the shape of the Northern Alliance. In Afghanistan and Pakistan there were real
havens for terrorists. In Afghanistan, up to five million refugees have returned
since 200 1. To speak about these matters too loudly might be to undermine the US
position in Iraq, where the origins and course of the outside involvem ent have
been different, and where the flow of refugees has been outward. NATO leaders,
anxious to put the recriminations of2003 over Iraq behind them, may be nervous
about highlighting the differences between Afghanistan and Iraq.
A major question, heavy with implications for international security, is: how are
the setbacks experienced in Afghanistan to be explained, especially within NATO
member States? The United Nations may be accustomed to failure, but NATO is
not. So far, the tendency has been to blame Pakistan, the messy NATO command,
the poor attention span of consecutive US governments, the unwillingness of
NATO allies to contribute, the weakness of Karzai, the corruption of his government, the shortage of foreign money and troops; in other words, to blame almost
everything except the nature of the project.
The various reasons that have been given can not be lightly dismissed. For exam ple, the lack of NATO unity in certain operational matters has been striking: the inability of member States to agree on a straightforward and defensible common set
of standards for treating prisoners in the Afghan operations is symptomatic of deep
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divisions within the alliance. Political divisions have never been far from the surface and will no doubt be projected into future explanations of what went wrong.
Continental Europeans can convincingly blame the Americans and the British for
having taken their eye off the ball in Afghanistan in 2002-03, foolishly thinking
that the war there was virtually won and that they could afford to rush into a second
adventure in Iraq. Americans can blame the Europeans fo r putting relatively few
troops into ISAF, and being slow to back them up when the going got rough in
2006-08. A less blame-centered explanation might be that the reconstruction of
Afghanistan, and the pursuit of counterinsurgency there, was always going to be an
extremely difficult task; that there are limits to what outsiders should expect to
achieve in the transformation of distant societies with cultures significantly different from our own; and that it never made sense to invest such effort in counterinsurgency in Afghanistan without having even the beginnings of a strategy for the
neighboring regions of Pakistan.
Impact on International Security
The problem of Afghanistan-including the complex interplay ofinternational actors who have pursued their interests there--has had an impressive and multifaceted impact on international se<:urity issues in the past generation. It contributed
to the end of the Cold War and indeed of the Soviet Union itself. It assisted, and
continues to assist, the rise and proliferation oflslamic militants around the globe.
The Taliban regime's fa ilure to control al-Qaeda activities launched the United
States into the huge and seemingly endless "War on Terror," led to the United
States acquiring unprecedented access to Central Asia, and also resulted in the Security Council claiming unprecedented powers to affect activities within States.
The Afghan war has embroiled NATO in a largely civil war thousands of miles from
its North Atlantic heartlands. It also threatens to destab ilize Pakistan. Even worse,
by feeding the mutual suspicion between India and Pakistan, and opening up another fron t in their long-standing rivalry, it makes war between these two nuclear
powers a distinct possibility.
One impact of Afghanistan on international security may turn out to be highly
paradoxical. It is obvious that Afghanistan, along with Iraq, has called into question the idea that the United States, in its supposed "unipolar moment," could
change even the most difficult and divided societies by its confident use of armed
force. But it is not only the ideas of the neo-conservatives and their camp-followers
that are in trouble. In many ways the involvement of NATO in Afghanistan was
textbook liberal multilateralism: implicitly approved by the UN Se<:urity Council,
involving troops from forty democracies, cooperating with the UN assistance mission, and pursuing admirable aims to assist the development and modernization of
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Afghanistan. The very ideas of rebuilding the world in our image, and of major
Western States having an obligation to achieve these tasks in distant landswhether by unilateral or multilateral approaches-may come to be viewed as optimistic. Or, to put it differently, and somewhat cryptically, Afghanistan may not
have quite such a drastic effect on the American imperium as it had on the Soviet
one in the years up to 1991; but it may nevertheless come to be seen as one important stage on the path in which international order became, certainly not unipolar,
and perhaps not even multipolar, but based more on prudent interest than on illusions that Western ideas control the world. Afghanistan, like Somalia, may contribute to greater caution before engaging in interventionist projects aimed at
reconstructing divided societies. Whether this is a cause for celebration or regret
may be debated: in 1994 Tutsis in Rwanda had good reason to rue the US caution
that resulted from the Somalia debacle.
Despite all the difficulties encountered in Afghanistan since the fall of the
Taliban in 2001, in the US presidential election campaign in 2008 both Barack
Obama and John McCain promised to increase the US commitment to Afghanistan in 2009. There was little prospect either that the insurgency would subside or
that the United States would tiptoe out of the war. Furthermore, both candidates
advocated continuing and even extending the practice of using US force against
Taliban and al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan. The war's international dimension, and
its significance for international security more generally, was set to continue.
The Debate on Policy Choices
The Obama administration's policy planning for Afghanistan is based on the
sound presumption that the Afghan problem cannot be addressed in isolation. Although many countries have a potentially important role in any settlement in Afghanistan---especially Iran, with its large numbers of Afghan refugees and its major
drug problem-Pakistan is at the core of this approach. Granted the indissoluble
connection between Afghanistan and Pakistan, any policy in respect to the one has
to be framed in light of its effects on the other. At times it may even be necessary to
prioritize between these two countries. The simple truth is that Pakistan is a far
larger, more powerful and generally more important country than Afghanistan. If
the price of saving Afghanistan were to be the destabilization of Pakistan, it would
not be worth paying. A principal aim of the United States in the region should have
been, and indeed may have been, to avoid creating a situation in which that particular price has to be paid: yet at least once before, in the Soviet-Afghan war in the
1980s, something very like it happened.
The main conclusion of any consideration of the Pakistani factor in the ongoing
conflict in Afghanistan has to be that the policy of the United States and allies-to
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strengthen central government in both countries-has been operating in extremely difficult circumstances, has been pursued erratically and has been largely
unsuccessful. While it is not obvious what the alternatives might be---open acceptance of regional autonomy in both societies would have some merits-the general
approach of backing non-Pashtuns in Pakistan and Afghanistan risks exacerbating
the Pashtun problem in both countries. Three distinct causes-Pashtun, Taliban
and al-Qaeda-have become dangerously conflated. It should be a first aim of
Western policy to reverse this dangerous trend.
Because of the grim prospects of a stalemate, a war of attrition or worse in Afghanistan, and also because of the advent of new governments in Pakistan in 2008
and the United States in 2009, there has been at least the beginning of consideration of alternative policies. Two stand out: each in its way addresses directly the
growth of the insurgency and each is based on a recognition that the Pakistani dimension of the problem has to be considered alongside the Afghan one. Both options take into account the central requirement of any approach-that it be geared
to ensuring that neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan offers the kind of haven for organizing international terrorist actions that Afghanistan did under Taliban rule.
The first option centers o n negotiation with Taliban and other Pashtun groups.
The first question to be faced is whether, on either side of the border, there are sufficiently dear hierarchical organizational structures with which to negotiate. The
second question is whether Afghan Taliban/Pashtun goals are framed more in
terms of control of the Afghan State along the completely uncompromising lines
followed by the Taliban in the years up to 2001 , or in more limited terms. Whatever
the answers, negotiation in some fo rm with some of the insurgent groups and factions is inevitable. Indeed, in an informal manner some is already happening.
Combining fighting with talking is quite common in insurgencies, not least because of their tendency to result in stalemate. Yet it is never easy, and is likely to be
particularly difficult for those on both sides who have chosen to see the war in Afghanistan as a war of good against evil. It is also likely to be difficult if, as at present,
the Taliban believe they are in a position of strength. A critical question to be explored in any talks is whether, as some evidence suggests, Taliban leaders have
learned enough from their disasters since seizing Kabul in 1996, and in particular
from their near -death experience in 2001, to be willing to operate in a different
manner in today's Afghanistan. 94 The continuing commitment of the Taliban in
Pakistan to destroying government schools, and its opposition to education for
girls, does not inspire confidence. The scope and content of any agreement are
matters of huge difficulty. Some agreements concluded by the Pakistani government in the past few years are widely seen as having given Taliban leaders a license
to continue supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan. This serves as a warning of
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the hazards of partial negotiation. Yet the pressures for negotiation are very strong,
and a refusal to consider this course could have adverse effects in both countries.
In October 2008, after a two-week debate that was not always well attended, the
Pakistani Parliament passed unanimously a resolution wide1y interpreted as suggesting above all a shift to negotiation. Actually it was a complex package, in which the
Parliament united to condemn terrorism and at the same time was seen as "taking
ownership" of policy to tackle it. The Resolution said that regions on the Afghan
border where militants flourish should be developed, and force used as a last resort.
It opposed the cross-border strikes by US forces in Pakistan, but at the same time
indicated a degree of support for US policy. It called for dialogue with extremist
groups operating in the country, and hinted at a fundamental change in Pakistan's
approach to the problem: "We need an urgent review of our national security strategy and revisiting the methodology of combating terrorism in order to restore peace
and stability. "9S At the very least it provides one basis for the Obama administration
to recalibrate the United States's largely burnt-out policies toward Pakistan.
The second option under discussion involves a fundamental rethinking of security strategy in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. On the Afghan side of the border it
would call for some increase in ISAf or other outside forces, especially to speed up
the pace of expansion of the Afghan army, and thereby to provide backup so that
certain areas fro m which the Taliban have been expelled can thereafter be protected. It would also call for cooperation in security matters with local forces and
councils, with all the hazards involved. One infonned and persuasive critique of
the approach to counterinsurgency used in Afghanistan since 2003 suggests that its
emphasis on extending the reach of central government is precisely the wrong
strategy: its authors, specialists in the region, argue instead for a rural security presence that has been largely lacking.96 A security strategy based on local forces and
councils would also call for expansion of aid and development programs, especially
in urgent matters such as food aid in areas threatened by famine, and for a serious
effort to address the widespread corruption which makes a continuous mockery of
Western attempts to bring reform and progress to Afghanistan. On the Pakistani
side it would involve a protracted effort to develop a long-term policy-hitherto
non-existent-for establishing some kind of government influence in the FATA,
and for a joined- up policy for addressing the Taliban and al-Qaeda presence. On
both sides of the border it would necessitate reining in the use of airpower to reduce its inflammation oflocal opinion.
For reasons indicated in this article, it is highly improbable that either of these
options on its own could provide a substantial amelioration of a tangled and tragic
situation. However, a combination of the two policies-both negotiating, and rethinking the security strategy-might just achieve some results. Such a dual
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approach has been supported in 2009 by John Nagl, one of the architects of the new
US counterinsurgency doctrine. Advocating the adaptation of this doctrine in the
special circumstances of Afghanistan, he has stated: "At the time, the doctrine the
manual laid out was enormously controversial, both inside and outside the Pentagon. It remains so today. Its key tenets are simple, but radical: Focus on protecting
civilians over killing the enemy. Assume greater risk. Use minimum, not maximum force. » His advocacy of these principles is accompanied by emphasis on the
importance of dealing with local forces as well as national governments both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan.97
An approach along such lines would need to include other elements as well, including a strong and credible commitment to leave as soon as a modicum of stability is achieved. Such a combination would need to be pursued in both Afghanistan
and Pakistan . It could only work if a new US administration rejected the worst aspects of previous policies, and pursued the matter with more consistent attention
than in the past. It would be likely to result in some unsatisfactory compromises,
and might build on, rather than fundame ntally change, the pattern oflocal loyalty
and regional warlordism that is so rooted in Afghanistan. Yet if the war in Afghanistan is not to have even more fateful consequences for international order than
those seen in the past three decades, it may be the direction in which events have to
move.
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